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This paper examines an instrument which establishes an explicit link between 
economic power and foreign policy of the European Union (EU): restrictive measures 
or sanctions. As the EU is increasingly confronted with situations requiring a firm 
response, sanctions – arguably the EU’s ‘hardest’ tool – have become somewhat of 
a standard reaction. To what extent are sanctions a relevant tool for EU external 
action? By looking at several case studies from a set of 47 autonomous EU sanction 
cases, this paper acknowledges the many internal and external difficulties the EU 
faces when using the sanctions tool. However, it also shows that despite those 
challenges, the ‘hard’ and coercive nature of the sanction instrument nevertheless 







Over the years, the European Union (EU) has been called many things. One of the 
most reiterated as well as debated role conceptions is the one of ‘Normative Power 
Europe’ coined by Ian Manners.1 Multiple points of criticism have been voiced, 
however, as the EU too often is accused of pursuing material interest over norms and 
values. Others, including the author, seek to go beyond the normative debate by 
taking on a ‘strategic perspective’.2 The reality is that the EU does not – stricto sensu - 
have military capacities at its disposal, and will not any time soon. Then what does 
the EU have? As the EU is the “biggest player on the global trading scene”, the most 
conclusive answer seems to be: economic power.3 
 
This paper analyses an instrument which links economic power and foreign policy: 
restrictive measures or sanctions (both are used synonymously here). In light of the 
recent proliferation in the use of sanctions by the EU, combined with what appears 
to be a not so successful track record,4 the question rises whether sanctions are a 
relevant foreign policy tool for the EU. Not only the recent proliferation, but also the 
relatively ‘hard’ nature of the instrument – quite rare in the EU context – mean that 
further research is warranted in order to remedy both the current lack of in-depth 
studies on EU sanctions and the shortage of down-to-earth foreign policy 
recommendations.5  
 
According to the European Commission, “sanctions are an instrument of a 
diplomatic or economic nature which seek to bring about a change in activities or 
policies such as violations of international law or human rights, or policies that do not 
respect the rule of law or democratic principles”.6 This notion implies various types of 
measures which are applied in different circumstances, ranging from the absence of 
rule of law to armed conflict. 
 
Following the example of Portela, this study differentiates between ‘formal’ and 
‘informal measures’: while formal measures are those that are taken within some sort 
                                                 
1 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258. 
2 For example S. Biscop & J. Coelmont, Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces: The Making of a 
Distinctive Power, Oxon, Routledge, 2012. 
3 European Commission, “EU position in world trade”, 24 April 2013; World Trade Organization, 
International Trade Statistics 2012, Geneva, World Trade Organization, 2012, pp. 26-29. 
4 See dataset of 47 EU sanctions in annex V of L. Leenders, Restrictive Measures: ‘The EU Way 
To Go’?, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2013. 
5 Interview with (former) Member State Official 3, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, response 
to the author’s questionnaire on EU and Autonomous Restrictive Measures, Brussels, 28 April 
2013. 
6 European Commission, “Sanctions or restrictive measures”, 2008. 
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of legal framework, ‘informal sanctions’ have in common that they have no specific 
label, “they were adopted in the absence of a CFSP [Common Foreign and Security 
Policy] act, and outside any contractual bilateral framework”.7 The relevance of this 
last category is confirmed by the sanction practices of Russia and China, which use, 
for example, energy resources and trade potential to nudge third countries in the 
desired direction without adopting formal measures.8 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the EU as a foreign policy actor. EU sanctions which 
merely implement resolutions of the UN Security Council (UNSC) are therefore not 
treated here, because those would distort the assessment. It is, however, not always 
possible, nor desirable, to separate the EU’s autonomous sanctions rigorously from 
those adopted by the United Nations.  
 
To what extent have sanctions been and are they still a relevant foreign policy tool 
for the EU? Relevant is seen here as the best act of response given a particular 
situation within a particular environment.9 This is assessed via a study of two classic 
aspects of sanction theory: effectiveness and coherence which seem to be 
inextricably linked. ‘Effectiveness’ refers to the degree to which the immediate 
effects of the sanctions, for example economic disutility or reputational damage, 
have translated into the achievement of the sanctioning actor’s goals.10 This variable 
will be assessed using two sets of indicators: an internal set, referring to the 
management of the sanction episode by the sanctioner, and an external set, 
assessing the role of the external environment. In short, the conceptual framework 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
Internal environment: management 
1. Ex-ante: planning and adoption 
2. Implementation, enforcement and monitoring compliance 
3. Ex-post: responsiveness and flexibility 
External environment: 
1. Target level: response and domestic situation 
2. International level: allies, bystanders and opponents 
 
                                                 
7 C. Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy, Oxon, Routledge, 2010, p. 102. 
8 Ibid., pp. 102-126; P. Rutland, “Russia as an Energy Superpower”, New Political Economy, vol. 
13, no. 2, 2008, pp. 203-210; and J. Reilly, “China’s Unilateral Sanctions”, The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4, 2012, pp. 121-133. 
9 European Commission, “Aid Delivery Methods. Volume 1: Project Cycle Management 
Guidelines”, Brussels, EuropeAid Cooperation Office – Development DG, March 2004, p. 144. 
10 European Commission, “Aid Delivery Methods. Volume 1”, op.cit., p. 131-133. 
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Coherence refers to the degree to which the EU acts ‘consistently’,11 according to its 
discourse, and in a similar way, when the situation is similar (mutatis mutandis). 
 
The research is based on a dataset comprising 47 cases of EU autonomous formal 
and informal sanction practice.12 Since informal measures are by nature difficult to 
track, this dataset should be considered non-exhaustive. By looking at EU practice 
from its initial stages to this present day, some interesting tendencies can be 
discerned, which led to the following case selection: First, given the relative density 
of EU sanctions in Africa and Europe and the presence of no less than three grave 
chronic cases in the EU’s vicinity, the paper focuses on the European 
neighbourhood. In the southern region, Libya and Syria are two cases which have 
known volatile relations with the EU: both have faced EU sanctions since 1986, but 
had their sanctions lifted for ‘good behaviour’ — until the events of 2011. They thus 
offer an interesting comparison of relatively more and less successful EU sanctioning. 
The focus on the EU’s southern neighbourhood is further warranted for a number of 
reasons, such as the important historical ties,13 the recent sanction response to the 
events of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the absence of such a condemnatory position 
towards other countries, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.14 In the eastern 
neighbourhood the focus is on the chronic case of Belarus. As the two previous 
cases, the case of Belarus comprises one relatively successful, and one extended 
episode which has been gradually tightened (and eased) throughout the last 
decade. Complementing the southern dimension with an eastern angle allows us 
therefore to compare both good and bad practices of EU sanction practice across 
the European neighbourhood. Second, the formal-informal distinction deserves 
attention. More insight into why informal measures in this dataset were seemingly 
more successful could help identify specific elements that might improve the EU’s 
sanction practice. 
 
The paper will proceed as follows. First, it will provide a brief general overview of the 
use of the sanctions tool by the EU, identifying the main characteristics and 
challenges of the EU’s sanction practice. Second,the actual EU practice is evaluated 
in a series of case studies. Finally, the paper concludes by formulating general 
conclusions and policy recommendations concerning the use of sanctions. 
 
  
                                                 
11 C. Gebhard, “Coherence”, in C. Hill & M. Smith (eds.), International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 105-106. 
12 Leenders, op.cit., p. 86. 
13 A.N. Christensen, The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2011. 
14 Interview with (former) Member State Official 3, op.cit. 
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The EU and the instrument of restrictive measures 
 
Although the use of sanctions might have proliferated, they are only used by the EU 
as a measure of last resort. This is reflected by the fact that it was only in 200315 and 
200416 that the Council presented its two main documents on the use and 
implementation of sanctions. In 2004, the Council explicitly set out the objectives the 
EU wishes to achieve by adopting sanctions: 
The Council will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support of efforts to fight 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as a 
restrictive measure to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of 
law and good governance.17 
 
These objectives are usually translated into what the literature calls ‘primary goals’.18 
These are relatively straightforward and seek the compliance of the target, for 
example the reinstatement of democratic rule after a military coup. It is, however, 
largely established that the EU’s sanctions often also, or some would say even 
mostly,19 pursue ‘secondary’ or ‘tertiary goals’, which have to do with, respectively, 
internal goals (which concern the sender, e.g. to build an image) or external goals 
(which concern the international scene, e.g. to show support for the United 
Nations).20  
 
While the situation at hand often requires a swift process, in practice the time span 
for adoption ranges from “two weeks to long, protracted and complex discussions 
that can last up to more than three months”.21 This already indicates that EU Member 
States’ interests play an important role in the EU’s sanction practice. As a Member 
State official put it: “Member States refrain from hurting themselves economically. In 
many cases that results in a watering down in negotiations”; while “political pressure 
[…can nevertheless push] Member States beyond their economic self-
preservation”,22 others argue that the outcome “not always results in effectiveness”.23  
                                                 
15 Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive 
measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy”, 
15579/03, Brussels, 3 December 2003. 
16 Council of the European Union, “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures 
(Sanctions)”, 10198/1/04, Brussels, 7 June 2004 [hereafter, “Basic Principles”]. 
17 Council of the European Union, “Basic Principles”, op.cit., p. 2. 
18 J. Barber, “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument”, International Affairs, vol. 55, 1979, 
pp. 367-84, quoted in Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 
19 See C. Portela, “The EU’s ‘Sanctions Paradox”, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
October 2007, pp. 6-7. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Interview with Member State Official 2, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, response to the 





If, then, measures are indeed adopted, the EU needs to be able to properly manage 
them. A great deal of criticism has been voiced concerning this ability,24 which, as 
mentioned earlier, concerns mainly three aspects: planning, implementation and 
monitoring, and responsiveness. 
 
In the planning stage, the EU tries to adopt a so-called ‘tailored approach’. This 
means that “as a general rule, sanctions should target as closely as possible the 
individuals and entities responsible for the undesirable policies and actions, thus 
minimizing adverse effects on others”.25 As significant interests are at stake, the main 
challenge for the EU, however, lies with the implementation, enforcement and 
monitoring of the measures in place. In most cases, the Member States are 
responsible for the enforcement and need to report to the Commission on the 
implementation of the measures.26 “However, where sanctions are implemented on 
a national basis [for example arms embargoes or visa bans], monitoring mechanisms 
are less clear.”27 
 
Managing a sanction regime also means being responsive to changes on the 
ground and reviewing the measures “in order to ensure they are contributing 
towards their stated objectives”.28 While the EU is sometimes criticised for lifting a 
measure too early, the opposite occurs as well, as a situation of path dependency 
can result in chronic sanctioning cases.29 It is important to mention that not only the 
EU’s sanction capacities and political will, but also numerous external factors, such as 
the size of the sanction coalition or the domestic situation of the target determine 
the degree to which the EU is able to take up the international role to which it 
aspires.30 
 
Hence, the EU’s sanction practice faces several challenges. Leaving external 
difficulties aside, we could state that these emanate, at their core, from what could 
be seen as two main difficulties that in turn influence the internal environment in 
which the sanction tool is used. First, the EU brings together 28 Member States and 
these inevitably pursue their own particular interests. Second, the EU, often denoted 
                                                 
24 A.W. de Vries & H. Hazelzet, “The EU as a New Actor on the Sanctions Scene”, in P. 
Wallensteen & C. Staibano (eds.), International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the 
Global System, Oxon, Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 99-10; Portela, European Union Sanctions and 
Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 39; K. Gebert, “Shooting in the dark? EU sanctions policies”, Brussels, 
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2013, p. 2. 
25 European Commission, “Sanctions or restrictive measures”, op.cit., p. 6. 
26 Ibid., p. 9. 
27 de Vries & Hazelzet, op.cit., p. 101. 
28 Council of the European Union, “Basic Principles”, op.cit., p. 3. 
29 S. Lehne, “The Role of Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy”, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 14 December 2012. 
30 Interview with (former) Member State Official 3, op.cit. 
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as a ‘soft power’,31 still lacks military capabilities, but is nevertheless required to 
respond to its environment and to secure its interests. The instrument of sanctions 
illustrates the dilemma the EU faces when trying to balance between its ‘realist’ 
interests and ‘idealist’ identity.32 
 
The EU faces both internal and external challenges with regard to its sanction 
practice: insufficient solidarity combined with divergent Member State interests, 
tensions between ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ needs, uncooperative international actors, 
etc. This paper argues that even though these challenges affect the EU’s practice, 
the ‘hard’ and coercive nature of the sanction instrument still make it a relevant 
foreign policy tool for the EU. Given that certain of these challenges can be 
addressed, the instrument has the potential to become more effective, more 
coherent and more relevant. The degree to which the EU is able to deal with these 
internal and external challenges is therefore crucial for the EU’s credibility and role as 
an international actor. 
 
The following section investigates how these challenges appear in the EU’s sanction 
practice, to what degree they affect the relevance of the sanctions tool for the EU, 
and what lessons could be learned. 
 
The case of the southern neighbourhood: aiming for regime change and balancing 
values and interests 
 
A significant factor in the recent proliferation of the use of sanctions by the EU has 
been the popular uprisings in the Arab world starting in 2010-2011. In Tunisia and 
Egypt, for instance, sanctions were used to prevent ousted leaderships from 
accessing state funds, whereas a more extensive range of measures was adopted in 
the case of Libya and Syria.33 
 
Libya 
Libya was confronted with a first and informally adopted EU sanction episode in 
1986, when it was accused of being involved in several terrorist attacks such as on a 
Berlin discothèque.34 In 1999, the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi began his 
                                                 
31 Nye defines ‘soft power’ as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, 
and policies.” Soft power is therefore contrasted with military power or ‘hard power’. J. Nye, 
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, pp. x-31. 
32 Portela, “The EU’s ‘Sanctions Paradox”, op.cit., p. 7. 
33 C. Portela, “The EU’s Sanctions against Syria: Conflict Management by Other Means”, 
Egmont Security Policy Brief, Brussels, September 2012, p. 1 [hereafter, “The EU’s Sanctions 
against Syria”]. 




attempt to normalise relations with the US and the EU by handing over the two 
Libyans blamed for the crash of PanAm flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland.35 Although 
the EU’s sanction regime was lifted in 2004 (after Qaddafi engaged in several acts of 
goodwill), this relative success cannot unequivocally be attributed to the EU’s 
sanctions. The episode was largely dominated by the UN which imposed its own 
sanctions in 1992. EU sanctions remained in place for almost twenty years and a US 
air raid in 1986 had clearly signalled the military capacities backing the international 
demands.36 
 
Thus, while the EU’s sanction episode arguably caused some economic disutility for 
Libya, it could be said that its own effect was fairly limited. The fact that Libya’s main 
source of revenue, the oil and gas sector, was only indirectly affected, and that EU-
Libya trade was hence not fully halted, partly explains why.37 Moreover, the 
measures were even said to have had unintended and sometimes even perverse 
consequences. For example, in an attempt to counter the effects the sanctions were 
having, Libya started deporting migrant workers in large numbers.38 It is thus no 
wonder that from the moment Qaddafi complied with the EU’s principal demands, 
the EU was more than willing to resume normal relations, as “this served the political 
interests of the EU (it could point to a limited success) and its economic interests 
(there was no need to give up on lucrative trade)”.39 The sanctions were therefore 
lifted even if this meant turning a blind eye to a degree of continuous human rights 
violations which in Belarus led to a tightening of sanctions.40 
 
The violations and repression, which the EU had left unaddressed for six years, 
suddenly became very visible again in 2010, when a revolutionary movement 
demanding democratic reform swept through the region. The ensuing repression led 
to civil war, and following UNSC resolution 1970,41 the EU adopted its second and 
fairly comprehensive sanction regime against Libya. This included an arms embargo, 
visa restrictions, asset freezes, a comprehensive flight ban and several trade 
                                                 
35 K.T. Szabo, “Libya and the EU”, Budapest, Center for EU Enlargement Studies, 2006, pp. 14-
15. 
36 Hill & Smith, op.cit.; Council of the European Union, “Common Position (1999/261/CFSP) of 
16 April 1999 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union concerning Libya”, Official Journal of the European Communities, L103, 20 April 1999, 
pp. 1-2; K.T. Szabo, “Libya and the EU”, Budapest, Center for EU Enlargement Studies, 2006, p.  
15. 
37 T. de Wilde d’Estmael, La dimension politique des relations économiques extérieures de la 
Communauté européenne, Bruxelles, Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1998, p. 312. 
38 Ibid., p. 313. 
39 Ibid., p. 7 [author’s translation]. 
40 Gebert, op.cit., p. 5. 
41 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1970 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at 
its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011”, S/RES/1970(2011), 26 February 2011. 
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embargoes.42 Sanctions were “expanded and continued to be enforced throughout 
the civil war”,43 and they loosened again following Qaddafi’s death and the rebels’ 
victory in October 2011.44 
 
The situation in 2011 was different from the one in the 1990s. Although both sanction 
episodes mainly emanated from security concerns, the objectives they aimed to 
achieve were fundamentally different in nature. While the initial measures in 2011 
demanded the ”immediate end to the use of force”,45 it had quickly become clear 
that a de facto regime change would be necessary to address the grievances of 
the Libyan people.46 This partly explains why Qaddafi showed no sign of 
reconsidering – on the contrary –,47 and military intervention was needed to unseat 
the dictator: “no regime will commit suicide in order to get sanctions lifted”.48 Further 
sanctions thus perversely hardened the regime’s resolve. 
 
Although this time the EU imposed a more comprehensive oil and gas embargo, it 
still did not go all-out. The oil and gas sector was affected by an assets freeze on 
Libya’s oil and gas companies, amongst which also joint ventures with the French 
firm Total and firms located in the UK or Germany.49 The fact that energy interests are 
never far away, was illustrated by rumours of a promise made by a rebel fraction of 
“35 per cent of Libya’s crude oil to France” in exchange for its support.50 And while a 
full arms embargo was introduced by the UN and implemented by the EU, both the 
US and several EU Member States have provided Libyan rebel fractions with “self-
defence material”, while there are speculations about covert shipments of other, 
more lethal weaponry as well.51 
                                                 
42 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2011/137/CFSP) of 28 February 2011 
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L58, 3 March 2011, pp. 53-62; Gebert, op.cit., p. 5. 
43 Gebert, op.cit., p. 6. 
44 European External Action Service, “Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force”, 21 February 
2013. 
45 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2011/137/CFSP) of 28 February 2011 
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya”, op.cit. 
46 C. Ashton, “Statement by the High Representative following the London Conference on 
Libya”, Brussels, 29 March 2011. 
47 V. Walt, “Gaddafi’s Son: Last Gasp of Libya’s Dying Regime?”, Time Magazine, 21 February 
2011. 
48 Gebert, op.cit., p. 8. 
49 Council of the European Union, “Council Implementing Decision (2011/236/CFSP) of 12 April 
2011 implementing Decision 2011/137/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the 
situation in Libya”, Official Journal of the European Union, L100, 14 April 2011, pp. 58-71; “EU 
imposes full oil and gas embargo on Libya”, Euractiv.com, 13 April 2011. 
50 “EU lifts sanctions on Libyan ports; rebels dismiss report they promised France oil”, Al Arabiya 
News, 1 September 2011. 
51 A. Tucker-Jones, “Is Europe Covertly arming Libya’s rebels?”, Public Service Europe, 12 





EU sanctions against Libya have not been very effective. While the episode of 1986 
was lifted after a relative success, the immediate effects of the measures were 
arguably not the main reason why the EU’s demands were finally met. The 
combination of flawed planning and the particular domestic situation of the target 
even caused the sanctions to have unintended and perverse effects. The EU’s 2011 
sanctions were, however, even less effective. The planned sanction objective 
became too ambitious, the scope of the measures and the subsequent 
enforcement was arguably not ambitious enough, and while the domestic 
opposition was united but yet fragmented at the same time,52 Qaddafi’s resolve only 
hardened. Eventually, military intervention was needed to unseat the dictator. 
 
There are also challenges in terms of coherence of the EU’s approach over time. To 
this day, the domestic situation of the country is not under control,53 as a result of 
which the EU maintains certain measures such as the arms embargo and assets 
freeze.54 It is, however, hard for the EU to further criticise ongoing human rights 
violations and impose harsher sanctions, given that the EU fully lifted its measures in 
2004, when similar facts were occurring under Qaddafi’s dictatorship. In other words, 
doing so would indicate that the EU approves of such a situation under a dictator, 
but not after a legitimate regime has been installed.55 
 
Syria 
Often the differences between the Libyan and the Syrian cases are stressed because 
of the different way in which the international community responded to the 
respective crises.56 However, also certain parallels can be drawn. In 1986, Syria too 
was implicated in terrorist practices and similarly faced EU informal sanctions. 
Already then, an arms embargo was adopted. It remained, however, rather 
symbolic, as it still allowed existing contracts to be honoured.57 Nevertheless, from 
1987 on, Syria tried to display ‘good faith’, and after Syria’s participation in the anti-
                                                 
52 A. Shadid & K. Fahim, “Opposition in Libya Struggles to Form a United Front”, The New York 
Times, 8 March 2011. 
53 G. Shennib, “Militiamen briefly storm Libyan parliament to demand vote”, Reuters, 14 
January 2014. 
54 European External Action Service, “Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force”, 31 July 2013; 
J. Wilson, B. Palmer & N. Bellfort, “Status of EU sanctions against Iran, Libya and Syria”, 22 May 
2012. 
55 Gebert, op.cit., p. 6. 
56 See, for instance, R.A. Greene, “Analysis, Syria is not Iraq, or Libya or …”, CNN International, 
31 August 2013. 
57 Hill & Smith, op.cit., pp. 327-328; J. Kreutz, “Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions policy 
of the European Union 1981-2004”, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Paper no. 45, 
2005, p. 26. 
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Iraq Gulf War coalition, the EU agreed to lift its sanctions in 1994, even though, as in 
the case of Libya, Syria’s human rights record did not merit reward.58  
 
The sanction episode cannot be considered a failure, nor a complete success. 
Although measures were rather weak, Syria did engage in several acts of goodwill. 
At the same time, however, the country was still allegedly involved in terrorist 
practices throughout the 1990s.59 Nevertheless, one could say that those sanctions 
achieved more than the current sanction regime. Yet, their effect was not very 
sustainable: Syria became more and more isolated in recent years and the brutal 
repression of democratic uprisings that began in 2011 was widely condemned.60 
While Russia and China vetoed every proposal for a strong UNSC resolution imposing 
sanctions on Al-Assad’s regime, the EU, together with the US, went ahead and 
imposed a set of measures in May 2011. They were further tightened in reaction to 
continuing atrocities and finally comprised almost every measure in the EU’s 
toolbox.61 These measures, which were adopted with remarkable speed, “are having 
a noticeable economic impact. Yet, the choice of measures is ill-suited to stop the 
bloodshed”.62 As in Libya, it quickly became clear to the EU that the goals previously 
set out would necessarily imply regime change,63 and so the EU locked itself in the 
adoption of sanctions, as no political solution was in sight.64 Given the lack of 
agreeable alternatives, the sanctions regime remains the strongest response 
available to the EU.65 Two measures in particular merit further attention. 
 
According to Portela, the arms embargo is not expected to have major effects, 
since the EU did not have a significant arms trade with Syria anymore. In fact, Syria’s 
top weapons suppliers were Russia, Iran, Belarus and North Korea, and Russian arms 
exports continued into 2012.66 This was even exacerbated by a lax EU Member State 
implementation, exemplified by Cyprus, which allowed “Syrian allies to traffick arms 
to Assad via its waters”.67 
 
                                                 
58 “Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
retrieved 25 April 2014, http://www.piie.com/research/topics/sanctions/syria.cfm. 
59 Ibid. 
60 “Syria profile”, BBC News, 25 March 2013. 
61 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2011/782CFSP) of 1 December 2011 
concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/273/CFSP”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L319, 2 December 2011, p. 56. 
62 Portela, “The EU’s Sanctions Against Syria”, op.cit., pp. 1-2. 
63 European External Action Service, “Frequently Asked Questions on EU restrictive measures 
against the Syrian regime”, 13 September 2011, p. 1. 
64 Interview with (former) Member State Official 3, op.cit. 
65 Portela, “The EU’s Sanctions Against Syria”, op.cit., pp. 1-2. 
66 Ibid., p. 3. 
67 S. Ryness, “Ashton on Syria: ‘Don’t accuse us of inactivity… if it was easy, we would have 
done it by now’”, European Jewish Press, 13 September 2012. 
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The energy embargo on Syria, on the other hand, proved more effective. It is of a 
rare kind, given that this level of comprehensiveness is not often agreed to “in the 
absence of a UNSC mandate”,68 and furthermore in stark contrast with the oil 
embargo imposed on Libya. The embargo prompted Dutch-British Shell and French 
Total to “cease activities in Syria”.69 While some see this as an example of the 
subordination of economic self-preservation in the face of political pressure,70 others 
remark that, ironically, it might have been the regime change in Libya, which “made 
it likely that oil from Libya will be able to flow to Europe again soon,” which freed 
“European hands to sanction Syria” more comprehensively.71 Syrian supplies 
furthermore only accounted for 1.5% of the EU’s total crude oil imports of 2010.72 
However, a comprehensive regime such as in Syria is all but targeted and thus 
affects the entire population.73 This also implies ‘collateral damage’. Not only did Al-
Assad’s resolve harden, businesspeople with ties to the regime were seen to profit 
from the situation by “buying up real estate at bargain prices and selling natural gas 
and diesel”, even though EU sanctions were designed to affect this very group.74 
 
The EU has nevertheless tried to be responsive to changes on the ground. Under 
pressure from the UK and France, the EU finally decided in May 2013 to drop the 
arms embargo, so that the opposition could be armed.75 The EU had de facto 
chosen sides which also became clear from the easing of the oil embargo.76 This 
would “allow the Syrian National Coalition [SNC] to take advantage of the oil and 
gas reserves under its control”, yet “without an interim government, nothing can be 
done now,” said Al-Qadi, a member of the SNC.77 The EU, however, could to some 
extent benefit from this amendment, given that European companies could resume 
trade in gas and oil – officially on condition that “the cash goes to the rebels”.78 
Monitoring this exemption could, however, prove difficult, given the unstable 
situation on the ground.79 
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While the lack of results in the face of these measures confirms that sanctions are not 
always fit to achieve certain goals, the case of Syria above all illustrates the 
importance of the external environment. This has been shown firstly by the 
organisation of the domestic opposition forces, or lack thereof, since the opposition 
remains, as in Libya, united but fragmented at the same time, even after the SNC 
was internationally recognised.80 
 
Secondly, the international context of Syria is very different from the one in the 
Libyan case, and might constitute the most important cause of ineffectiveness. 
Although the sanctioning coalition comprises the US, the League of Arab States and 
multiple countries which have aligned themselves with the EU’s measures,81 the 
active support for Syria from Iran and especially Russia (and the passive stance of the 
other BRICS countries) seriously offset all efforts.82 It was only when the Syrian 
government was accused of using chemical weapons, and a military intervention by 
the United States was imminent, that a strong UNSC Resolution 2118, demanding the 
“expeditious and verifiable destruction” of those weapons, was adopted.83 Thus, only 
when the military means backing the demand of the whole international community 
became explicit did Al-Assad decide to comply – on that front at least. 
 
Both in the Libyan and in the Syrian cases, we could thus see the limits of the sanction 
instrument. It has become clear that sanctions are not fit to induce regime change, 
but can lead to some results when used for more modest and less threatening 
objectives such as the extradition of terrorist suspects. This has further been made 
explicit by the fact that a credible threat to use military means was needed for some 
degree of change to materialise. Rather unsurprisingly, the effectiveness of trade 
measures also depends on the trade relations at hand. While the comprehensive oil 
ban on Syria is said to have showed that “security interest [can in fact] trump 
commercial advantage”, we have to point out that in 2010, the share of Libyan oil 
constituted 10.5% of the EU’s oil total oil imports, while the Syrian supplies accounted 
for a mere 1.5%.84 Moreover, when concrete interests do not determine the design of 
a measure, they can still feature in the implementation and enforcement stage.  
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Given the situation in Syria today, the EU’s sanctions towards the Al-Assad regime 
cannot be deemed a success. While a comprehensive set of measures was 
adopted, the arms embargo, for example, was not fit to have major effects in the 
Syrian case – especially if the monitoring of the embargo was said to be 
questionable. Although a comprehensive energy ban was adopted, and the EU was 
responsive in its management by easing the oil embargo, Al-Assad only decided to 
partly comply when a credible military threat was issued. And as in Libya, even 
perverse effects arose. 
 
The main reasons for this ineffectiveness are however situated in the external 
environment. While on the domestic front the Syrian opposition still struggles with 
fragmentation, internationally, Russia, as one of Syria’s main allies, has proven to be 
the key obstacle to effective sanctioning. 
 
Although both the Syrian and Libyan cases result in a rather negative assessment, the 
conclusion concerning the EU’s sanctioning does not necessarily need to be 
completely negative. The EU can only be as effective as the international 
community allows it to be. Secondary and tertiary goals furthermore need to be 
factored in, as in the Syria case, where sanctions allowed the EU to profile itself 
internally and externally as an active international actor whom other countries 
follow.85 However, in this endeavour, the EU has ironically also aligned “itself with the 
regional powers that resist the spread of democracy in the Middle East, such as 
Qatar and especially Saudi-Arabia”.86 
 
EU policy in the Gulf 
To complement the above with an assessment of the coherence of the EU’s 
sanctions in the neighbourhood, the focus is shifted briefly to several countries not far 
removed from Libya and Syria. After more than two years of sanctioning in the 
southern neighbourhood, the following question can be raised: why did the EU not 
impose sanctions on the Gulf region? 
 
In Bahrain, “bloggers and youth activists […] are being arrested”,87 and anti-
government protestors are sentenced to prison for life.88 While the “Bahrain National 
Dialogue” between regime and opposition has been re-launched multiple times – 
most recently in January 2014 – and a “Ministry for Human Rights” has been set up, 
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not much has improved.89 The European Parliament has strongly criticised “the lack 
of an EU response to the ongoing situation […] and calls on the VP/HR to […] impose 
restrictive measures”.90 But besides statements and Council Conclusions regretting 
further violations and encouraging renewed dialogue, the EU has not adopted an 
active stance on the matter.91 
 
Saudi Arabia faces similar demands for reform,92 and while people get arrested for 
“unlawfully protesting”,93 or even executed in public,94 no strong condemnation was 
issued by the HR/VP.95 Qatar still keeps a “tight control” over the country – a fact 
exemplified last year by the sentence of life imprisonment for a poet who allegedly 
insulted the Emir.96 Despite widespread “criticism over serious abuses of migrant 
workers […] building infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup”, Qatar keeps ignoring 
calls for reform.97 Geostrategic interests thus seem to trump human rights concerns.98 
Again, the EU has energy interests in the region,99 and during 2013 France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom were still looking to close lucrative (arms) deals in Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.100 On top of that, the EU’s ally, the US, 
has its fifth navy fleet stationed in Bahrain.101 
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The display of what some might call “double standards”,102 has both direct and 
indirect and short and long-term consequences for the EU. First, demands made with 
the use of restrictive measures, such as in Syria, become far less legitimate,103 
entailing obvious consequences for the EU’s attempts to persuade, for example, the 
BRICS countries to support a stronger condemnation of Al-Assad.104 Second, the fact 
that these Gulf countries were not sanctioned, inter alia resulted in a massive spread 
of weapons in the direction of conflict zones such as Libya and Syria, as well as Mali. 
In a sense, this incoherence in sanctioning countries (closing arms deals instead of 
imposing an arms embargo) could thus result in the indirect armament of forces that 
European countries are fighting – for example in Mali. Third, the EU loses its credibility 
as an international actor in general, which can become an issue for an actor that 
has constructed its entire international image around values and principles. Fourth, 
by adopting a mild stance towards the Gulf countries, the EU not only loses face, it 
also allows them to engage in an exercise of regional power shifting; exploiting 
instability in one country, while trying to contain their own population. Finally, not only 
does this idle by-standing have negative consequences for EU (and US) principles, EU 
geostrategic interests in the region also advocate a longer term approach 
considerate of what is actually going on, since ignoring the “popular resentment in 
Bahrain and elsewhere in the changing Middle East is bound to backfire against 
[…the EU’s] long-term and strategic interests in the region”.105 
 
The case of Belarus: balancing positive and negative conditionality  
 
While also located in the EU’s neighbourhood, Belarus represents a very different 
case, as Belarus’ eastern proximity seems to bring a lot more sensitivities into play. This 
case does furthermore not implicate immediate security concerns for the EU, but is 
primarily about upholding respect for human rights and the principles of democracy. 
 
EU-Belarus relations have been characterised by a back and forth between crisis 
and political thaw. The EU’s sanction regime against Belarus goes back to 1997, 
when it was still informal and consisted, for example, of a freeze of the TACIS 
programme. These initial measures were a reaction to unfair elections and violent 
repression in 1995 and 1996. While over the course of the following years further 
measures were taken and then lifted again, a formal sanction regime was adopted 
by the EU in 2004 for Minsk’s continued lack of respect for human rights and the 
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principles of democracy.106 In the subsequent years, asset freezes and a withdrawal 
of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) were added. In 2007 some measures 
were lifted again to induce further positive developments, only to be imposed and 
expanded again with an arms embargo and asset freezes when the regime cracked 
down on protesters criticising the rigged elections of 2010.107 
 
Two things stand out compared to the cases from the EU’s southern neighbourhood: 
the main body of the sanction regime is firstly very targeted and, secondly, 
managed quite responsively. This is because the EU has tried to engage in ‘dual-
track diplomacy’: while it targets the leadership, it at the same time tries to foster a 
stronger domestic civil society and avoid harm to the larger population as much as 
possible.108 While the suspension of the EU’s GSP seems to be rather 
counterproductive in that last regard, no serious damage was to be expected as 
“only 12 per cent of Belarusian exports to the EU were covered by the GSP”.109 The 
violations of the GSP criteria and subsequent complaints by several international 
trade unions and the International Labour Organisation were furthermore hard to 
ignore. 
 
Interestingly, there even was a “significant increase in trade with the EU over the last 
years — Belarus effectively doubled exports to Europe compared to 2010”.110 Again, 
energy interests seem to play a role. A member of the Belarusian opposition stated 
that 50% of Belarus’ trade today was with the EU, a large share of which involved 
trade in oil products with entities “connected to the Lukashenko family”.111 While this 
might be seen by some as an obvious cause of ineffectiveness, others point out that 
it was never the EU’s intention to disrupt all trade.112 
 
According to the President of Belarus, the EU even “need[s] Belarus".113 It seems like 
the geographical proximity make Member States’ divergent interests all the more 
explicit. Even though the cost for the EU as a whole is marginal,114 several Member 
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States such as Slovenia or Latvia openly opposed the adoption of certain measure. 
For example, “Slovenian company Riko Group was heavily involved in a €100 million 
hotel venture with Belarus tycoon Yuri Chizh, one of the three businessmen close to 
Lukashenko who were to be blacklisted”.115 Moreover, the fact that the situation in 
Belarus resembles more a protracted (political) struggle than all-out civil war, could 
help explain the absence of a more scrupulous reaction. If we combine the Latvian 
reluctance to jeopardise the €500 million (or 2-3% of its GDP) it earns from the transit 
of Belarusian goods a year, with the fact that the country “does not have a system 
for monitoring compliance” with EU measures, we may understand that also the 
Member States’ ex-post monitoring might not be very rigorous.116 
 
The continuous tightening and easing of sanctions nevertheless indicates that the 
Council adopted a rather responsive strategy with regard to Belarus.117 However, 
there is a fine line between responsiveness and incoherence, as the EU (all too) often 
resorted to positive conditionality. An example is the invitation of Belarus to the 
Eastern Partnership, while in 2006, in a non-paper presented by the Commission, 
participation in the ENP was made conditional upon certain reforms and other 
demands, which had not been met.118 Bargaining the lifting of sanctions might be a 
smart pragmatic choice according to some,119 but making concessions while getting 
little in return does not exactly sound like a bargain. Instead of inducing change, the 
EU’s sporadic shifts towards positive conditionality have rather “signalled the little 
leverage the EU has”, and thus diminish the EU’s credibility.120 
 
As in Libya and Syria, sanctions might even have been counterproductive, as 
Lukashenko sees them as a challenge. He even used them to create what Galtung 
called a ‘rally around the flag effect’,121 as “the leadership capitalized on Western 
condemnation, portraying the country as being ‘under siege’”.122 One of the biggest 
causes for ineffectiveness is, however, situated on the international level, as Russia’s 
position has been a crucial determinant in Lukashenko’s calculus.123 This also means 
that every sign of deterioration in Belarus’ relations with Russia could create a 
window of opportunity for the EU. The energy crisis of January 2007 constituted such 
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a moment.124 However, while this prompted Belarus to seek an opening with the EU 
and to partly accommodate the EU’s demands, this very move also provided 
Lukashenko with a bargaining chip to use in its talks with Russia. That way, he could, 
for example, negotiate better energy prices in return for its membership of the 
Russian sphere of influence.125 
 
Therefore, even though the EU’s demands could be regarded as feasible for the 
regime, the latter can weigh out options and make a simple cost-benefit analysis 
before selecting which sanctions it wants to be lifted. Given, for example, that 
Belarus virtually does not make use of the EU’s GSP, the regime did not think it worth it 
to prevent the suspension of its trade preferences, even though the procedure 
preceding such a decision provides for numerous occasions to do so.126 
 
All in all, the case of Belarus has illustrated again that both EU Member States’ 
interests and the actions of other global players shape the EU’s sanction practice. As 
a result, the sanctions imposed on Belarus have not had much impact so far.127 To 
begin with, several Member States tried to water down sanctions. Trade between the 
EU and Belarus continued significantly, and also proper enforcement and monitoring 
of the measures in place was not guaranteed. On the external front, it is clear that 
Russia’s behaviour has not been furthering the EU’s goals, but also the lack of a 
“clear and unanimous opposition constituency inside the country that supports the 
sanctions policy” is not conducive to change.128 
 
As mentioned earlier, the back and forth of tightening and easing sanctions has not 
only been ineffective so far, it also risks creating an incoherent practice. Belarus is 
furthermore “the only country in the region to suffer from EU sanctions”, even though 
for example Azerbaijan’s policies are not much friendlier.129 
 
But also this case has shown some good practices: the EU is designing tailored and 
responsive sanction strategies. When the opportunity arose in 2007, it was partly due 
to the Commission’s non-paper, stipulating concrete conditions for lifting, that the 
“EU-Belarus confrontational course” was reversed.130 Relations between Belarus and 
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Russia might have recovered, but Belarus is aware of its structural problems. 
According to Ditrych, this fact, together with the increasing trade between Belarus 
and the EU, means that the EU should adopt a more pragmatic approach, 
bargaining the lifting of one sanction after the other, and while doing so moving 
towards cooperation – whilst, of course, maintaining strict conditions.131 This means 
that the EU faces a difficult balancing exercise on multiple fronts: it needs to signal 
disapproval while formulating “a sanctions goal policy that would not be 
[completely] unacceptable to the regime [or harm] or alienate the opposition”,  as 
the first would push Belarus towards Russia, and the latter could turn the opposition 
against the EU.132 A response that is too weak would on the other hand equally 
damage the EU’s credibility. One way to simplify the exercise would be to try to find 
common ground with Russia, and thus weaken Belarus’ bargaining position. But, 
interestingly, Russia too has not been exempt from the EU’s sanction practice. While 
the Crimean crisis of March 2014 has even triggered formal EU sanctions against 
Russia, the EU’s sanction practice against global powers remains characterised by 
the use of informal sanctions. 
 
The case of informal sanctions: from flexible measures against small countries to 
signalling disapproval to global powers 
 
This section looks at a particular category that encompasses measures that were not 
adopted in a formal sanction framework. These informal measures can, however, 
consist of just the same types of sanctions. In the case of Cuba, for example, a 
number of diplomatic measures were agreed, but via Council Conclusions instead of 
a legal document.133 Interestingly, the dataset of 47 EU sanction cases seemed to 
indicate that informal episodes could be more successful than formal ones.134 Given 
the challenges emanating from the EU’s internal set-up, informal measures might 
indeed be a useful alternative to the more difficult CFSP procedure. In the case of 
Pakistan and India, for example, the instrument of informal sanctions allowed the EU 
to react even when there was no consensus in the Council.135 However, while a swift 
response is desirable, it is not likely to be very effective without strong content, and 
thus the sanctions against Pakistan and India were not very successful in achieving 
their initial goal – to halt nuclear tests and get both countries to sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Ironically, the informal nature of the measures then also 
allowed the EU to easily retreat from its “condemnatory position” and even refrain 
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from following through “its threat to suspend the GSP preferences”.136 In other words, 
while the flexibility in the absence of a legal framework allows for a swift adoption, it 
equally implies some flexibility with regard to the lifting of the regime. Several informal 
sanction cases further reveal that other factors might have been more instrumental 
in the achievement of their goals. In the case of Serbia and Turkey, for example, their 
application for EU membership puts the success of EU informal sanctions in 
perspective.137 The case of Cuba further illustrates that effectiveness also depends 
on leaders’ sensitivity to the symbolic weight of sanctions, as Cuba over the past 
decade was looking for international recognition, not isolation.138 And in the case of 
Guatemala, it was more likely the US aid suspension and domestic pressure that 
caused the quick compliance with EU and US demands.139 
 
The success of informal measures is thus relative, and they can even be 
counterproductive. When the EU suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA), the 
measure in fact hit the PA’s labour force the most, and is considered to have 
countered the development of democracy and governance and even “discredited 
the legitimacy of Western policies and enhanced Hamas’ image of resistance in the 
eyes of the Palestinian population”.140 
 
It is clear that informal sanctions do not offer a magic solution to the EU’s sanction 
challenges, let alone a worthy alternative to CFSP measures. Using informal measures 
might come in handy if Member States do not want to be tied down by legal 
decisions, or if disagreement impedes an EU reaction, but they do not seem fit to 
pursue an effective and coherent sanction strategy.141 Not only does their undefined 
nature create problems in terms of enforcement, it also complicates the 
management of the measures. This is because the absence of a formal procedure 
for lifting informal measures can imply flexibility, but can sometimes also result in 
chronic cases, as no “timetable for renewal” is foreseen.142 The absence of a fixed 
legal framework furthermore means that not only the Council, but also the 
Commission and even the Parliament become EU sanction actors. Informal measures 
do, however, fulfil a particular role: they allow the EU to signal disapproval, while not 
inflicting too much harm on strategic relationships. Various EU sanction cases 
involving relatively small to medium powers have shown that it is not always easy for 
the EU to balance its commercial or geostrategic interests with its normative interest 
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to uphold the values it defends. This balancing exercise is all the more challenging 
when facing a global power. While up until now this paper spoke about China and 
Russia as significant external factors in the effectiveness of EU sanction episodes 
towards third countries, China and Russia, too, constitute the target of EU sanctions. 
 
China 
Informal sanctions usually do not entail heavy measures such as embargoes, but the 
arms embargo against China is a notable exception. The measure was adopted 
following the violent repression of demonstrations on the Tienanmen Square in 1989, 
and given the extensive relations – including military cooperation – , the sanction 
regime can be seen as “an anomaly”.143 The division within the Council on this 
contentious subject in the absence of “an expiry date, or ‘exit-clause’”, has 
furthermore created a “sanction trap” from which the EU cannot easily escape.144 
 
While the informal nature normally would give the Council some leeway to decide 
on the lifting of its measures, protest from the European Parliament, civil society 
organisations and not the least the US, prevented the tentative moves to lift the 
embargo in 2004.145 The motives to lift the embargo were in any case not connected 
to a substantial change of the initial situation that triggered the measure.146 
According to Human Rights Watch, “China continues to be an authoritarian one-
party state that imposes sharp curbs on freedom of expression, […] openly rejects 
judicial independence and press freedom, and arbitrarily restricts and suppresses 
human rights defenders”.147 Despite the fact that EU Member States “interpret the 
embargo on sales of arms to China in different ways”,148 and that existing contracts 
were not influenced, there is a “general restraint” to conclude new deals with 
China.149 However, apart from a certain symbolic reputational damage,150 the 
measure clearly does not seem to have much effect, and commercial interests 
weaken Member States’ resolve.151 
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Russia 
China is not the only global power facing EU sanctions. The EU’s sanctions against 
Russia go back to 1994 and formed a response to four military interventions in the 
context of three conflicts: the military campaigns in Chechnya in 1994 and 1999, the 
Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula 
from Ukraine in 2014. However, once it was clear that the response to the second 
Chechnya campaign had not yielded any result, TACIS funding was reactivated and 
an Action Plan for relations with Russia was drafted.152 When Russia invaded Georgia, 
a similar story unfolded: negotiations on the new Partnership Agreement were 
postponed,153 but even though Russia did not comply with the EU’s demands, talks 
were resumed two months later.154 
 
The sanctions against Russia from 1994 to 2008 confirm that geostrategic interests of 
the EU in continued cooperation with the global power can outweigh the EU’s 
‘moral responsibility’ to impose harsh sanctions. Even though measures such as the 
suspension of the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment under the PCA or the GSP 
privileges were considered, they were not adopted. According to Portela, this sign of 
“half-heartedness […] may [even] have encouraged Russia to disregard” the EU’s 
reaction completely.155 
 
However, the current EU sanctions against Russia for its involvement in the pro-Russian 
protests in Crimea and Russia’s subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 
18 March 2014 add a new dimension to this story. On 6 March 2014, after the 
Crimean Parliament voted to join Russia and scheduled a referendum, the EU again 
adopted informal sanctions, suspending talks with Russia on closer economic 
cooperation and deciding with other world leaders to have a G7 meeting in Brussels 
instead of a G8 meeting in Russia in June 2014.156 However, on 17 March 2014, after 
the illegal Crimean referendum to join Russia, the EU added asset freezes and visa 
bans targeted against those Russians and Crimeans (amongst which the Prime 
Minister) implicated.157 These measures can be regarded as the first formal EU 
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sanctions against Russia,158 but also these measures did not yield significant results so 
far.159 
 
It is often said that “Russia and China are two countries that largely divide the EU”, 
and they know how to play this to their advantage”.160 This explains why most of the 
time only informal measures were taken: they are easier to adopt, less visible and, 
most importantly, they do not bind the Member States. The Crimean case shows that 
the EU is prepared to take a firm stance when the territorial sovereignty of a close 
neighbour is violated. Nevertheless, it is said that also the sanctions following the 
Crimean crisis are surrounded by a great deal of weariness on the part of certain EU 
Member States, as for example Cyprus and several EU companies expect severe 
(economic) consequences.161 At the same time, Russia and China have reportedly 
been seen to “forge closer ties”, jointly building a gas pipeline and even a deep 
water port in Crimea.162 
 
It is therefore not a surprise that the EU usually opts for informal measures when 
sanctioning these gobal powers, as the most important function of informal measures 
is to signal the EU’s disapproval without compromising further engagement with 
these powerful players.163 However, given the EU’s rather incoherent practice using 
informal sanctions, it should be careful not to signal instead that the EU takes up a 
position of dependency.  
 
Both the influence of Member States’ interests and of the EU’s external sanction 
environment have been confirmed by the EU’s sanction practice against China and 
Russia. Whenever sanctions were adopted, they were usually informal and did not 
have much effect. In the case of China, the arms embargo has become somewhat 
void of meaning, while in Russia, cooperation was often resumed, even if none of the 
goals had been reached. This is not responsive management, but simply an 
incoherent practice. It is therefore clear that the sanctions against China and Russia 
have not been effective – at least in the strict primary sense.  
 
To dismiss the informal sanction episodes as utterly ineffective would miss the point 
that they were not devised to jeopardise cooperation in the first place. It can thus be 
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concluded that even if the EU’s sanction practice is greatly defined by challenges 
emanating from both its internal and external environment, even if the problem at 
hand would ideally require other means, the instrument of sanctions nevertheless 





This paper set out to look at the EU’s sanction tool from a pragmatic perspective in 
order to provide some practical insights into EU foreign policy. Although the EU’s 
sanction practice is far from perfect, the case studies above support the hypothesis 
that sanctions have been and are indeed still a relevant foreign policy tool for the 
EU. Given the EU’s set-up as mainly an economic power (lacking true military 
means), the instrument of sanctions allowed the EU to respond to various crises, and 
thus has proven its utility.164 
 
The EU’s sanction practice is flawed, but looking at multiple sanction cases helps 
identify how the underlying factors play a role: The external environment can, for 
example, greatly diminish the EU’s sanction potential, as seen especially in the cases 
of Syria and Belarus. Other than that, all cases have shown that the nature of the 
concerns, the urgency of the situation and the links to the target – together with the 
material interests involved – will influence whether sanctions are adopted at all, and 
if so, whether they will be given real content. Interestingly, the comparison of cases 
within the EU’s neighbourhood has suggested that the geographical proximity 
influences the sensitivity of the political process of adopting sanctions. The cases of 
China and Russia have illustrated that, if relations are important enough, no harsh 
sanctions will be taken, no matter the geographical distance. On the other hand, it 
can be argued, with reference of the Syrian case, that a situation involving 
immediate security concerns can create enough political pressure to push states to 
put aside their economic self-preservation.165 The limited share of Syria’s oil in EU 
imports could, however, also help explain the EU’s ability to make this apparent 
sacrifice. 
 
It has been shown that these factors play a role not only in the design and adoption 
phase, but also when implementing, monitoring and managing the sanction 
regimes. Often the ‘naming and shaming’ principle underlying the infringement 
procedure does not really work. As every Member State will see its interests at stake 
by a certain measure one day – risking not properly enforcing it – , they are not keen 
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to install a tradition of quick reporting.166 Failures to properly enforce EU sanctions 
are, however, not necessarily intentional, and may be due to insufficient 
administrative capacity in certain Member States.167 The fact that there is a lack of 
information sharing between Member States only adds to the problem.168 
 
When it comes to managing a sanction regime after its adoption, there is “a difficult 
balance to strike between encouraging a government in further reforms, and 
rewarding it for past reforms”.169 Nonetheless, the EU should be careful not to be 
perceived as incoherent, or even dependent or weak, as this could significantly 
affect both its credibility and effectiveness. 
 
All this appears to be in line with the challenge mentioned earlier, and which is a 
constant across many EU foreign policy fields: the EU seems to be caught in a 
balancing exercise between the its ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ interests, as both internal 
and external expectations lead it to defend its norms and values, while its 
geostrategic and commercial interests could require doing the opposite. 
 
Nevertheless, looking at the Gulf region has made painfully clear that inaction is not 
a better alternative to sanctions. If aiming for primary goals, modest and practical 
objectives have proven most effective. However, EU sanctions have often served 
more secondary and tertiary goals, and with success. In the Syrian case, for example, 
the EU took a firm stance in absence of a UNSC resolution. Syria has moreover 
revealed that, if necessary, every measure in the sanction toolbox can be adopted 
over a short period of time. Belarus has shown that the EU sanction strategy is rather 
unique in its tailored approach, leaving room for dual-track diplomacy and 
constructive engagement if need be. The EU’s practice towards China and Russia 
has exemplified that when dealing with important states, the disruption of all (trade) 
relations is not always the main objective.  
 
The sanction tool remains, in other words, a relevant foreign policy instrument, and 
could become even more so if several short- to medium-term (EU-focused) 
recommendations following from this brief study would be taken into account. Firstly, 
it is often reiterated that the EU should develop its sanction capacities, as the 
institutions in place are often overburdened, a tendency which is worsening due to 
the growing complexity of sanctioning. This could involve a reinforcement of the 
Council’s Relex Working Group, and the setting up of mechanisms to enhance 
coordination between Member States and monitoring. A second recommendation 
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follows the observation that measures do not have effect if they aim too high. 
Therefore, the adoption of a more pragmatic sanctioning approach both in design 
as well as in management, setting several partial and realistic goals and engaging 
constructively with the target, whilst communicating openly to the international 
community about all choices made, could benefit effectiveness, coherence and 
credibility. In the medium term, a burden-sharing mechanism could help to even out 
the costs incurred by every Member State, and thereby alleviate tensions in the 
adoption phase. Unfortunately, this suggestion could be seen as wishful thinking as 
such developments require a general long-term evolution towards more solidarity 
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